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Communication from the Commission to the Council 
· :and the European. Parliament 
( 
Assessment and future of Community humanitarian 
·activities  · 
(article 20 of Regulation (EC) 1257/96). · 
1. Introduction 
Article' 20 of Regulation  (EC)  1257/96  concerning  humanitarian  aid  calls  on  the 
Commission, three years after the Regulation's entry into force, to  submit an overall 
· asse~srrient of operations  funded  under  it  to  the  European .Parliament  and  to  the 
Council,. together with suggestions for the future of the Regulation and, as necessary, 
proposals  for  amendments· to  it.  Accordingly,· the  Commission drew  up  terms  of 
reference  for  an  independent  evaluation,  which  was  carried  out over a  period of 
approximately one year and included extensive desk  and field studies. The consultants  _ 
submitted their findings to the Commission in April 1999. 
'  -
The  consultant  report  had  two  objectives:  firstly,  to  carry  out  an  evaluation  of 
operations  over  ihe_  period  in  question;  and  secondly,.  to ·provide  an  outside 
·perspective on elements which should be reconsidered or changed. 
·In parallel with this cy~luati~n. the Council requested an  cvalu~tion ofall Community 
dcvclopmei1t  assista-nce  from. the  preceding  p~riod,  i~e.  1991  to  1996.  Within that 
framework, an analysis w'as also made ofhumanitarianassistance.  -: 
This means. that the Commission now disposes of  two evaluations, together covering 
eight years of operations,  including the whole period since the creation of the EC 
Humanitarian Office, ECHO.  ·  -
. The  Commission  has  studied  the  findings  of- both  reports,  which  converge 
substantially.  In broad t~rms it can agree with the· evaluations made. 
(The pr~sent Communication lays out so~e  _of t~e principal l_essons borne out by ~hese 
_ evaluatiOns,  an~  ·states how the  CommiSSion  mtends to gtve effect to  these,- m  an, 
integrated way, within the 'months and years to come. At the same time·, the incoming 
Commission  ~ishcs to· study  longer-term  priorities  for  humanitarian  assistance  at 
greater leisure.  The result is a  practical communication, which situates itself within 
the overall reform effort, and  focuses on immediate priorities ·which can broadly be 
described as being of a managerial nature without neglecting the wider policy issues, 
which the Commission will address in depth at a later stage. 
The Communication is  not· a  substitute for,  or summary of,  the consultant reports 
themselves,  but  rather  a  reading  of. their  principal  conclusions  as  seen  by  the 
Commission and correlated with other independent sources of  inforn1ation such as 
internal  Commissi<?n  evaluations, discussions with partner humanitarian  agencies, 
1 Member States,  and  many  l)thcrs.  It is  fair  to  say  that  all  these  sources  present a 
picture which  is  largely compatible with  ~hat of the consultant reports  themselves  : 
ECHO's work is evaluated positively, but not uncritically. There is scope and need for 
improvement which the Commission is determined to realise- all the more so bearing 
in  mind  its  position  as. the  world's most  important  single  source of humanitarian 
assistance
1  ~· and  a  donor  roughly  equivalent  to  all  lifteen  EU  Member  States 
combined. 
It should be stated at the outset that neither the article 20 consultant report
2  nor this 
Communication  is  aimed  at  a11  assessment of pcrfom1ancc rela_tive  to  other donors, 
nor  at  presenting  a  ·comprehensive  list  of  undeniable  past  achievements.  The 
Commission considers that either undertaking would be inappropriate in a document 
of this kind, and limits· itself therefore to a short overview of the scope of operations 
over the period in question. 
The structure of the Communication is as follows. In the ·next section, some headline 
information  concerning  ECHO's  operations  over  the  period  is  presented.  This  is 
followed  in  section  3  by  the  overall  evaluation  of operations  contained  in  the 
consultant reports, together with the  an~lysis on which it  is  based, and the broadest 
strategic  issues  identified.  In  se.ction  ·  4,  .  the  Commission  comments  on  these 
observations. In  section 5,  the Communication follows  the consultant report by then 
going on to discuss the main  factors  in ECHO's way of working which  have been 
identified by the consultants as lying behind the problems identified, or proposed as a 
solution to them. The Commission's comments are interspersed after each point. The 
action plan that the Commission ir1!ends to follow to address these issues is set out in 
section ?, followed by some general conclusions.  -· 
The  issue  of whether  this ·is  an  appropriate  moment  to  propose  modifying  the 
Regulation deserves particular attention. 
The consultants  propose that  many of the  issues outlined in  section  5  actually be 
included as requirements within a revised Regulation. Nonetheless, they conclude that 
the Regulation itself is  basically sound and remains valid.· The proposals made are 
/mainly  of  two  sorts:· further  codification  of  scope  of  action,  and  additional 
clarification of  principles. 
Tlie approach taken by the Commission in this Communication is to be understood in 
relation to  this basic orientation of the consultant report. The Commission considers · 
that the team's drafting suggestions reflect a fair analysis and are mostly, therefore, in 
themselves quite valid. However, the level of  detail suggested by the team would not 
normally find its way into a Regulation of  this kind, and might be counter-productive 
in  reducing aspects of the 'flexibility which has proven so  useful in the past. It might 
also create unrealistic expectations  regarding ECHO's operations to  lay out in such 
1 The total programme of the United States Government has been larger in many years, but it is  split 
between  different  departments.  The  order  of magnjtude  is  in  any  case  roughly  the  same  as  the 
Commission total. 
2 In th\'! remainder of  this Communication ;,the consultant report" refers .to the evaluation for the period 
1996-99, '·i.e. the period after the entry into force of  regulation No. 1257/96. 
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detail  all  possible  modes  of intervention.  None  of the  suggestions  constitutes  a 
·compelling reaso~ to propose changes to the Regulation. 
Accordingly, the  line taken  by .the Commission at present consists in  setting out its 
_commitment to  many of these pri'nciples in the present' ( 'ommuriication, but without· 
changing tlw Regulation, which already provides, ii1  its-view, sufficient flexibiliiy to 
accommodate the changes required: 
Inevitably, proble~lS encountered,in the complexities of crisis response, rather than in' 
the technical operation of the Regulation, do raise questions as to the optimal mix  ··of 
instruments, of which humanitarian aid is just one.  This, however, would require a 
'broader reflection than article 20 mandates. At this stage, the Communication intends 
to  do  no more than open a  window on issues relevant 'to  a ·longer-term  and more 
encompassing revit;:w of  strategy in this area.  '  ' 
Prior to entering into the detailed dis¢ussion it  m~st be stressed that humanitarian aid 
is  not  and  will  ncvcr·be risk  free.  It  is  a  fact  of life  that  relief items that go  into 
complex war zones that  may be hijacked, deviated or go astray.  The basic issue of 
access  often .n:!prcsents · a  hindrance  for.  carrying  out  operations  within  a  normal 
fram~work. While the c;ommission ~mphasises  accounta~ility it must be kept in mind. 
that it is commonly accepted by all relief donors that something lessthan 100% of  the 
. humanitarian aid may actually reach the, targeted beneficiaries. This is the price we 
sometimes have to pay for preserving human lives. ·  · 
2. Overview of activities
3 
•!•  Volume of operations 
A  measure of the  significance of EC  humanitarian  aid  is  the .volume of funding· 
·provided. ECHO and its partners were on average present In  some 67 countries over 
the evaluated period, during which time a total of €  1.8  billion was disbursed.
4 After. 
peaking .during  the. Great  Lakes  and  Ex-Yugoslavia· crises  at  €  700  million/year 
E~HO'  s qudget for  1998 was around € 500 million; in the wake of  the Kosovo crisis, 
it is set to reach its highest ever level in  1999, at around£ soo millior{  '  ' 
The  funds  managed  by  ECHO  arc  drawn  mainly  from  the  Commi_ssion  budget. 
(Chapter  87-21) ·and,  to  a  lesser  extent  (for  the  ACP  countries  on.ly),  from  the· 
European Development Fund (EDF). In both .cases, budgeted resources are mobilised 
by  means  of Commission  financing,. decisiol)s  adopted  in  consultation  with  the 
_  Member Sta~t:!s; depending on the amount concerned, and the degree of  urgency, this 
3  Unle~·s  otherwise  stated,  all  the  following  information  relates  to  the  period of the  article  20 
evaluation, i.e. June 1996 to April 1999 (when the consultants submitied their report to ECHO). 
•  ,  ,  •  ,  I  __, 
4 Over € 4 billion, represe-nting 8,000 operations contracts, since the creation of  the Office. 
5 These figures include the budget and the reserve. 
3 procedure  may  take  the  fonn. of simple  notificatio11,  or  formal  approval  in· the 
Humanitarian Aid .or EDF Committees as appropriate.  .  / 
•!•  Implementation: ·ECHO's partners 
While humanitarian action classically takes place in  response to  events that  are  by 
definition unpredictable, it is nevertheless the case that in  many of the chronic crises · 
in which relief  players are increasingly called upon to intervene, a degree of  planning 
is not 'only possible but desirable. Thus, while retaining its crucial capacity to adopt._ 
emergency decisions, during the period evaluated ECHO has moved where possible to 
a more stratcg_ic approach; it  is·now the norm ·for financing decisions to take the form 
of Global Plans - strategic documents setting out humanitarian priorities, objectives 
and budgets for a given region for a period of  six to twelve months.  : ·  · 
Although the Regulation allows for the direct implementation of relief activities by 
the  Commission,  in  practice  ECHO  channels· its  assistance  through  operational 
implementing  partners  most  of  whom  have  signed  a  Framework  Partnership 
Agreement (FPA). lri order to be eligible for ECHO funding, NGOs must comply with 
the criteria set out in article 7 § 1 &  2 of the Regulation.  As far  as NGOs who had 
·already signed the previous FPA are concerned, ECHO checked their compliance with 
these criteria in close cooperation with national administrations. In some cases, NGOs 
which had no working experience with their own national administrations have been 
submitted to  a mini-audit in  order to  check their compliance with article 7.  After a 
broad-based consultation process, the revised FPA came into force on 1 January 1999. 
To date,  some  170  agencies  have  signed  the  revised  FPA,  the  implementation of .-
which  is  continuously and jointly assessed.  For the period  1996-1998,
6  on average. 
56% of ECHO's aid was disbursed through NGOs (mainly, but not exclusively, based 
in  the  EU),. 25% through  UN  agencies,  principally UNHCR (traditionally ECHO's 
single biggest partner) a_nd  WFJ>,  and 11% through other international organisations, 
principally the  Red  Cross Movement (ICRC  and  IFRC).  The remaining  8 %  was 
spent  in  the  form  of direct  actions  by  ECHO or channeled through Member State 
specialised agencies. 
When they have signed the  FPA and undertaken to  respect its General Conditions, 
partners are eligible to  request ECHO funding  for  specific projects.  This process is 
expedited by the use of  standard  forms for proposals, budgets (which include standard 
·lump sum payments  for  staff,  transport  and  communications equipment),  contracts 
and reports. In some cases, ECHO funds NGOs who have noJ yet signed the FPA, but 
in this c·ase the verification of their compliance with the criteria in the Regulation is 
doJ]e before funding is granted. 
6  ECHO statistics are compiled annually. 
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•:•  Breakdown of operatioi1s
7 
Africct.  Otrihbcan  <tnd  Padfic.  From  199(l  to  I <J<JS,  ECHO  concluded  1005 · 
C()ntracts representing around f  582 .fnilliori  liJr relief opcr;ltidns in the ACP cquntrics 
(37.3'Yo of the total of.€ 1.56 billicm). The humanitarian agenda in Africa continues to· 
be set by complex emergencies, dominated by the intractable crisis in the Great Lakes 
·region,  in  particular the· aftermath  of the  Rwanda  genocide  and  the  civil  wars  in 
. Burundi and DRC. Other main areas·of  ~ritervention have included the. Horn of  Africa, 
·particularly Sudan (now in its sixteenth year of civil war), Angola, and Sierra Leone  . . 
Given the· enormity of relief rieeds  in Africa,  ECHO has  focused mainly ori  ''core · 
humanitarian"  activities,  i.e .. the  provision  of basic;  life-sustaining  assistance,· but 
· "grey zone" work has also been carried out in c~llaboration.with DG Development in 
_c;ountries such· as Mali arid  Niger: Finally, as air transport is often ~he only means of 
·moving aid. personnel  and  goods quickly and  safely  in  Africa,  ECHO has set  up  a 
·  dedi,cated humanitarian air  .service in Africa, ECHO Flight. 
Central  and.  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Newly  Independent  States.  ECHO 
concluded 837 contracts amounting to a total of  over € 589  millionb~tween 1996 and 
1998  (37.4% of ECHO.'s entire expenditure) for  this area of the .world. The type of 
operations funded have varied from  core humanitarian  activitie~ to  rehabilitatio~· and 
· resettlement work, particularly in  the case of  former Yuxoslavia,  to  which the lion's 
·.share (€"423 million) of these contributions has gone. ECHO has played a significant· 
role in the transition phase, and consiclerable progress has now been made in handing 
over rehabilitation programmes to  local authorities and long-term donors. ECHO has 
a]so  intervened in  a. number of  former Soviet republics  suffering the effects of the 
·:transition to a market-oriented economy, where the most vulnerable sectors of society 
have been hit hard by the withdrawal of State assistance. Finally, the Kosovo crisis, to 
which some €  3  78. million has been allocated .in  1999,  constitutes  ECHO's largest 
single intervention in the last three years  . 
. Latin  Aril~rica, Asia, Mediterranean and the Middle East  .. Frorri 1996-98 a total of 
88o operation contracts were concluded, amounting to  over~€ 324 million c25:3% o:f 
total expenditure). Among the forty countries assisted on three continents, ECHO has 
. responded to both man-made andnatural disasters -.notably the El Niii.o phenomenon 
and more recently Hurricane  Mitch- as well as chronic and sui generis c:rises, such as 
Cambqdia  and·  the  Middle-East,  which  fall  ·into  the·  area  between  relief  and· 
development.  The  presence of 'ECHO  and. its  partners. in  this  "grey zone" has  on 
several occasions enableq· the  Commission to  respond  rapidly and  appropriately to 
conventional  emergency  situations  arising  in  the  countries  concerned.' The  "grey 
zone" is discussed further below.  . 
. 
7 The figures quoted i.n the rest of  section 2 referto the full calendar years 1996, 1997 and 1998. Given 
ECHO's existing statistical system (ECHOStat), this is the,closest practical approximation to the period 
applied by the consultant's report- June 1996 to April1999. 
" 
5 3. Analysis of operations· and overall appreciation 
In  this section the major conclLisions of the consultant report relating to the impact of 
ECHO-funded  operations  arc  set  out.  The  Commission's  comments  on  these 
conclusions are in section 4. 
The consultants state that  they wished to  make allowances  for  the  short history of 
ECHO and difficult circumstances in  which it  has, had  to  operate,  and •  to  pursue a 
constructive approach. The approach followed is not a 'bottom-up' one, starting with 
observations on the basis of studying individual operations and then general ising from 
there.  Rather, the team  follows what it calls a  'challenge-oriented' approach, taking 
. widely agreed challenges to contemporary humanitarian aid as a starting point against 
which .to  assess  ECHO's performance. The clear intention nonetheless is to  'let the 
field talk' and to base the analysis on activities on the ground. 
•!•  Situating ECHO in its environment· 
ECHO was created .in  1992  with a global mandate to  fund  humanitarian assistance 
· and  protection in a flexible and specialised way better adapted to  emergency  needs~ 
While a number of crises already provided ample fustification for that decision, the 
Office  had  to  adapt,  itself  to  ail  increasingly  complex  and  changing  context, 
characterised by: an explosion of humanitarian crises around the world; increasingly 
hostile environments for relief operations, a perce'ived need by ail  operational actors 
to be more professional as well  as a growing debate on  the relationship between the 
humanitarian,  political  and  development spheres.  While  it  shared  this  environment 
with  many  other  international  actors,  ECHO  additionally  was  required  to  build 
procedures  and  develop .know-how  from  scratch  and  operate  in  an  administrative 
environment which was anything but designed for emergency operations. Therefore it 
is fair to  acknowledge that the considerable hopes and expectations that were vested 
. in  it  were much -more  than it could ever have been reasonably expected to  manage  . 
. Despite this, it has succeeding in being a visible expression of an EU otherwise too 
often abserit from major crisis theatres.  · 
Under these conditions, evaluations of ECHO's performance are invariably positive: 
.the  consultant  report  states· that  "ECHO  is  currently  financing  the  delivery  of 
humanitarian assistance at least as well as any other organisation, and probably better 
and  in  a  more  cost-efficient  manner· than  any  other  comparable  international 
organisation". 
The  ~valuators, and most observers, also  e~pect the need for humanitarian assistance 
to persist in the future at at least current levels. 
There is therefore, in the' view of  the consultants, no doubt that both the existence and 
status ofthe Office have been and remain amply justified. 
•!•  The 'grey zone' dilemma 
· Over the last decade, both thinking about and practice of  humanitarian assistance have 
evolved  substantially,  At  the  same. time,  ECHO  has  established  itself at  cruising 
·sp~ed, budgets have expanded and  remained high,  and  the  Office has  found  itself 
increasingly managing programmes ·in  the  so-called  'grey' area between relief and 
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development  - mainly  because  of the  absence  of sufficiently  flexi9le ·and  rapid 
alt'emative instruments in other parts of the Commission and a growing awareness of 
the complexity and interrelatedness of aid instruments-in responding to _humanitarian 
needs in  crisisR_  While needs  unden~ably exist, humanitarian operations in  the ''grey. 
zone  are  at  increased. risk  of proving  unsustainaBle,  and  in  the  view  of both 
. evaluations, this has unfortunately quite often been the case. 
The consulta-nt  report documents this  development well,  but struggles with how to 
react to  it.  It considers .three options:  a return  to  a stricter definition of emergency 
assistance ; ·a  twin~track  approach  within  ECHO  itsell';  or creatiljg  a  long-term . 
planning structure lllltside ECHO responsible for actions in  the grey zone. As regards  , 
the first option, and bearing in mind the human needs involved, the consultants do not 
favour re-establishing_ a strict, emergency definition of ECHO's mandate. They tend 
towards  the  second option,  maintaining that an  ECHO which· was  more aware and 
self-assured ·in ·its  humanitarian  role  could  erihancc  its  longer  term  impact 
significantly. In  this perspective, while flexibility to resporid to genuine emergencies 
certainly needs to  be maintained, and indeed strengthened, the team concludes that 
there.  is  room  - and  a  duty  - to  develop  a  more  strategic· approach. and  better· 
performance  monitoring.  The  third  option,  whilst  seen  as  highly desirable,  is  not 
considered achievable in the short teirn~  '  . -
The report does make the point that in many, imp~rtant cases humanitarian assistance 
is  theonly substantial  funding  presence  of the  EU  in  countries  of considerable · 
political interest, and notes this both as an ·important dimension of ECHO's activity · 
and as a potential source of  conflicting humanitarian and policy priorities.  · 
·  •:•  Analysis of operations 
· . The team  chose· something. over  I 00  operations' amongst  2196  funded  during  the · 
reference period, on  the basis of  relevance criteria,  for  in-depth  analysis, with 461 
analysed at a more general level. It should -be borne in mind that this analysis relates 
to  actions funded by the Commission, not carried out ·by  it.  Responsibility for both 
·achievements  and  failures  is therefore  shared  more  or _less  .equally  with  partners 
.d~pending ori the case; Many of  the problems identifieq are also by no means specific 
to· ECHO or to the projects 'it funds but common to many do,nors; maybe even to alL · 
An overall comment is  that,  whatever the achievements of humanitarian assistanc-e, 
·the fact remairte4, and the consultants often v~rified, that it is often at risk of simply 
underlining the  .failures of prevention and solution of crises; the harsh reality is that 
· hul!lanitarian assistance c_an ·only do so much. to prevent suffering in the absence of · 
. other measure~.  · · 
; 
In its general conclusions based-on this analysis;-the consultants consider. that over the 
period: 
8  In  addition. to  the  evaluations,  background  information  and  statistics  on  ECHO's operations  are 
available in its Annual Reports, the latest, covering 1998, being ·COM( 1999)367 of 26 July _1999,  and 
·on its website·(addi-ess europa.eu.int/comm/echo). 
7 ·.'  •  Global  Plans  (country  funding  strategies),  despite  their  limitations,  were  a 
positive development, and largely appreciated as a planning framework; 
.  ' 
•  Budget implementation rates were satisfactory by intcn1ational  stam~ards; 
•  The · revised  FPA  (framework  partnership . agreement)  made  a  positive 
contribution in enhancing predictability of procedures and constitutes a relative 
simplification;-
•  UNHCR~s work would  not  have  been of the  same quality  without  ECHO's 
support; 
•  ECHO has sustained the operations of many iritemational agencies and NGOs 
under o'therwise difficult circumstances, making a major contribution to stability 
within the international sy.stem ofhumanitarian response; 
•  Cost-effectiveness at the project level is. mostly good, especially for  operations 
with NGOs; ·  ' 
•  ECHO's achievements in evaluation and audit are spec'ifically singled out bythe 
consultants for 'praise; 
•  Finally,  ECHO's impact  always  has  to  be assessed bearing in  mind  failures 
elsewhere in adequately responding to crisis. 
Nevertheless: 
•  Choice of  partners did not always reflect experience and capacity sufficiently; 
•  The philosophy of linking relief and development mostly did not penetrate to 
partners and field operations;  · 
•  Many interventions in  the· area of health and nutrition are reviewed negatively 
due  to  very  weak  focus  on  sustainability  and  capacity-building,  as  well  as 
weaknesses  in · needs· analysis,· prioritisation  and  policy  on  the  types  of 
appropriate interven~ion; 
•  The gender dimension of  operations was rarely effectively integrated; 
•  More should have been don:e in the area of  protection; 
•  Rapid  response  by  ECHO  to  funding  applications,  while  possible,  became 
· increasingly exceptional~ even in emergency cases; 
•  Consultation on Global Plans was not wide enough, often not encompassing-the 
UN and local authorities as well as other key ac_tors on  the ground; 
•  There remained considerable scope for gains in cost-effectiv"eness through better 
use of  local resources; 
8 
.. i 
' 
·' 
j 
:J.. 
·j 
l 
! 
.. -- a  . ,. 'i 
\. 
'· 
o  Coordination with other services and  Member States. white very good examples 
were found; was moi·e olkn than not inadetiuate .. 
.  . 
•  Aid  has  sonictimcs contributed to  undermining  local  governance,  and  ECHO 
has not done enough to avoid thisrisk;  · 
Some illustrative example_s of  country assessments are as follows : 
•  'J:'he Sudan GlobafPlan is considered to have been exceptionally good; 
•  ECHO deserves recognition for its far-sighted approach in Colo~bia; it is also a 
. good example oflea:rning lessons;  · 
· •  Assist:1nce was highly  relevant in Palestine; 
'•,  . 
•  In  Camb~dia, the  flexibility and speed of ECHO  funding' and the efficiency of 
its  partners  produced  an  immediate, and  very  concrete  impact in  terms  of 
practical  reconciliation,  this  despite  problems  (shared  by ·nearly. every  other 
donor project) of limited sustainability due to the political context  .  .  . 
•  The large therapeutic and supplementary feeding programme funded by ECHO 
in  Buru~di .was  "particularly  professionally  run ...  fully  in  accordance  with 
international  standards".  It  was  limited  in  its  impact  on  the  Burundian  -· 
population· as  a· whole  by  access  problems  related  to  insecurity,  and  donor 
disinterest to support structural assistance;  .  '  . 
•  In Niger an "unusually coherent and complementary approach" was pursued, at 
. the behest of  the Delegation which "did not feel that the DG VHI  instruments at 
·'its disposal gave. it the necessary speed and flexibility"._Despite being well into  · 
the "grey zone",  impact was  good,  attentiveness  to  local  culture .exceptional, 
·and there w~re  clearly defined limits at which to stop funding. 
:  / 
Nevertheless: 
•  The response to  Hurricane  M-Itch  is coijstdercd to  1\ave  been good in  .. the. first 
stages, but: rather less so later;  · 
·•  _Activities in Azerbaijan as judged as only 'partly relevant'; 
•  The  absence of needed development  assistance  in· Cuba .limited what ECHO 
could do to addressthemain needs of  society, such as pre\renting the collapse of 
·health care and ·education, despite its best efforts over many .years;  ·  '_ 
•  After· a "fairly short" period of crisis  actually requiring  a relief intervention, 
- ECHO:. funded  activities  in  Haiti  are. said  to ·have  been  primarily  politically 
...  driven, . and  subsequently  .prolonged  by  a  rapid  loss  of  interest  by  the-. 
international  community  i.n  other types of assistance:  This made  it  extremely 
difficult to' achieve impact.  .  .  . 
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y •!•  Disaster preparedness 
Tlw  consultant  report  cot1finns  that  individual  disaster  preparedness  projects  have 
·usually been  c!Tectivc.  The  new regional  approach of the  DlPECHO programme is 
also  confirmed  a!?  felevant,  but  the  funds  available  are  considered  to  be  greatly 
insufficient  compared  to  the  needs  and  in  !='rder  to  achieve ·full  impact.  Outside 
ECHO, the consultants note that the Commission pays very little attention to disaster 
preparedness in its development assistance or in its research programmes. It also notes 
that  preparedness  projects  _cannot  be  treated  in  the  same . way  as  mainstream 
humanitarian ones, considering the different timescales and  a~tors involved .. 
•!•  Visibility. 
While· noting that  the  concept has  evolved positively,  the  consultants  still  criticise 
ECHO's  'visibility'. as  not  having had  a clear focus  or endearing  ECHO  to .many · 
humanitarian  actors.  They suggest moving to  a concept  of 'communication'.  They 
note  that  this  has  both  an  operational,  field  dimension  and  a  dimension. vis:-a-vis 
European  citizens and  their political representatives,  and  empha:sise  the  need  for  a 
strategy that is· really owned by the organisation and its staff. The consultants are also 
of  the opinion that the specific ECHO logo does notbring added value. 
•!•  Emergency response 
The consultants also.highlight the -specific  challenges posed by situations requiring 
genuine,  operational  emergency  response  capacity,  most  notably  natural  disasters. 
Presently, the EU as such has no capacity of  this kind. It has also been able to do little 
to build capacity elsewhere. The report recommends that such efforts be stepped up. It 
suggests specifically developing capacity to dispatch expert missions to the field and 
suggests  ECHO  might. function.  as  a  'coordinating  platform'  for  EU  response 
instruments.  It also  suggests  a  much  greater  emphasis  on  building  up  partners' 
capacities and further improvements in ECHO's funding procedures specificaily for 
emergencies. 
4. Commission comments on the overall appreciation 
At  the outset, the Commission wishes to record. its  appn:ciation for  the evaluation, 
which  has identified. a wide variety of issues of great  importance. There is,  indeed, 
· much in the report which genuinely was not known before. It is therefore a ~elcome 
springboard to enhance the quality oft~e Commission's ~ork. 
In  order  to  keep  matters  in  perspective,  however,  it  must  also  be  said  that  the 
consultants  do  not  always  fully  recognise  some  of the  constraints  imposed  upon· 
ECHO by an  extremely complex environment and administrative. constraints which 
are ill adapted to deal with emergency aid and the ensuing need for rapid response. It 
must, moreover, b~ borne_ in mind that d/1 of ECHO's operations require a far greater 
degree of rapidity  than· typically characterises  most aid  institutions,  even. in  'non-
emergency' situations. 
The direction that ECHO's activities have taken has evolved pragmatically, facilitated 
by  a  Regulation  which  intentionally offered  useful  latitude.  This development. was 
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motivated, and, in the Commission's view, to a  large extent justified, by its mission to 
_  address humanitarian needs. However, it must be conceded that these achievements -
and an extraordinary presence.on the world scene.- were sometimes accomplished at · 
the  cost of insufficient  rigor  in  analysis  and  project  nwnagement~ Tlie  'culture' of 
emergency  re_sponse  has  n1  many  cases_ inappropriately  been  carried  over to  _nol,1-
emergency operations. 
In  general terms,-rigidly determined 'areas  of responsibility  co~ld have  operational 
· costs and are no substitute for a dynamic and integrated approach. Nonetheless, within 
the  context of linking  relief to  rehabilitation  and  development - facilitated  by the.· 
.Commission's  deliberate  comoination' of humanitarian. and  development .portfolios 
under  a  single  Commissioner - both  ECHO  and  other services  do  need· to  focus 
clearly on what they do best. Accordingly, there  j~ a need'_ even if it is not easy- to 
Clarify and better organise the humanitarian mandate o( ECHO in the light of how it . 
has evolved .in practice.  · 
The Commission  ~I  so recalls that linking r~lief  a~d development, and closing the· gap 
between  them,. is  a  difficult challenge·  for  all  donors.  It is  an  area  where  the  · 
C~mmission has contributed substantially to what is a lively international debate. The 
·Commission will ensure that all services involved in development cooperation accord 
a priority to closing the transition gapwith humanitarian assistance in order to  ~flow· 
, ECHO an effective exit strategy at the earlies-t practical mo111ent.  A coherent strategy 
.is preferable to creating yet another struCture as suggested in·the consultant report. -
The· Commission -agrees  that  humanitarian  aid  is  an  important  part  of  ·the  EU's 
e~temai identjty. At the same time,' it  con~iders it to- be important that humanitarian · 
' assistance maintain a distance from  foreign policy in order to protect its impartiality, 
and intends to further develop guidelines to this end._ 
Regarding- the analysis of operations, it would extend this. Communication -unduly- to 
. comment  on  a  very  large  volume  of details:  The ·Commission  sees  no  reaSon  to 
dispute the main findings of the consultants. It must, however, constantly be borne iri 
mind  that  the  Commission~s scope to  influence direCtly  the operations jt  funds  and 
those who  implement them .is  often not as great as  might be desired. This limitation-
.  applies to  an even greater extent to attempts to influence the actions of other players· 
on the humanitarian  scene.  This is  not a reason not to  try,  but it is a reason to  be 
'  ' 
. realistic aboutthe rate of  lik~ly improvements  . 
.  The Commission agrees with the consultants on the need for-enhanced. attention to 
disaster preparedness.  ·.  ·  . ·  ·  · 
.Jt also acknowledges that the concept of 'c-ommunication' may be better than simply -
~visibility', though  it would continue to stress tl)e  accountability dimension.  Itc-also. 
intends to ensure that its field ·experts receive training in communication. 
· Regarding  the  logo,  the  Commission . considers  that  it_· is  ·a .  us~ful  way  of 
·communicating .its· humanitarian  activities to  the public,  although  it should not. be 
allowed to dominate relations with partners.·· 
Regarding emergency response, the Commission considers· that the ·question is well 
posed, but that  it is too early to-reply fully. It would welcome a debate on the issue, on 
11 which an internal reflection is  already· underway. The Commission does endorse the 
idea of greater attention to capacity building and  further streamlining of procedures 
and these points arc taken up below. 
.  .  . 
5.  Underlying problems and suggestions for improvement 
This section contains the observations made by the consultants which in their view 
underlie a number of  the operational problems identified in section 3. Their comments· 
arc given first under each heading, followed by the Commission's observati<;>ns which 
are shown in italics. 
•!•  Lack of a mission statement and of performance indicators 
The consultants attempt to deduce ECHO's mission from  the Regulation, but regret 
the lack of  a  clear mission statement from  management agail)st which performance 
could be judged. The consultant report is also of the view that strategy, policy and 
principles applying to choices regarding. funding shouid be better elaborated and all 
operations  be  given  specific,  verifiable  objectives,  hO\yever  rudimentary.  The 
consultants  are  unable  to  identify  any  use .by  ECHO of performance  indicators, 
whether ·in  programming,  project  planning  or  vis-a-vis·  its  own  administration 
(although they recognise that it has done some work on the subject). Both external 
evaluations stress the difficulty of  their task given the lack of  such indicat~rs. 
The Commission points out that there have been individual instances of  performance 
indicators being used in  prf.!ject management,  and in jitct traditional reporting on 
disbursement indicators at /e{tst has long been empfwsis('(/ within ECHO: indeed, the 
. consultant report recognises quite good performance in  this area.  At the same time, 
there  are  problems  in,  appzving  traditional  methods  to  humanitarian  assistance, 
especially  in  emergencies,  and few  donors  are  very  ·advanced  in  this  area.  The 
Commission has also supported the SPHERE project which  ~s an  important attempt 
by  operational  humanitarian  agencies  to  develop  performance ·standards  and 
indicators
9
. 
The Commission nonetheless accepts the general points made by the consultants,  and 
the measitres it ifi(ends to take are set out in section 6  .. 
•:•.  Need for improved project cycle management · 
The consultant report;  together with · the overall evaluation for. the preceding period, 
1991~96, and varjous .other cvaluations
10
,  notes a number of weaknesses in ECHO's 
performance.  It considers  that  little  is  done  to  collect  or  apply  lessons  learnt, 
institutional memory is weak,_ and ECHO·_ and its partners- often repeats identical 
mistakes. 
9
. See www.sphereprojcct.org 
10 E.g. Court of Auditors and intern~) audits. 
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Introducing the principles of project cycle  managemct~t (PCM),  in  a way which is.' 
appropriate  and  adapted  to  ECHO's  activities  and  its  resources,  as  well  as  the 
characteristics of specific crises and interventions, would, it  argues, go a long way to 
rcinedying some _or these observed weakness-es and installing a more  rcsults~oriented 
culture.  The consultants go  to  some  lengths  to  insist  that,  in  inost cases,  urgency' 
cann~t be invoked to justify· this absence. 
The  general  theme  of improving  project  m.anagement  underlies  a  number of the 
subsequent recommendation~. 
The Commission acknowledges that attention has indeed been drawn to weaknesses in 
pr~ject management across Commission aid programmes. not only by evaluations but 
also  by-the  Parliament,  the  CounCil'  and  the  Court  of Auditors.  Project  cycle · 
management is now being introduced in· ECHO as a resP,onse.to this criticism. 
The  Commission  has,  in  fact,  already taken  this  point  on  board and has  started 
developing  a  system· of  pr~ject 'management  ~hich is  -adapt~d to  humanitar(im 
. requiremen~s. 
_The  Commission  therefore agrees  with  this  recommendation,  on  the,understanding · 
·that  what  is  required  are  •veil-chosen  and  specifical~v adapted  tools  to  enhance 
i'111pact · and  transparency,  not  additional .  constraints  to  ,achieving  the  necessary 
fh!xihi'!ity inherent in humanitarian responsq. 
•!•  Measure results, not inputs 
Both  evaluations  stress  again  and ·again  that  ECHO  expends  enormous  and 
unnecessary efforts on controlling inputs, while it .neglects to control results. These 
efforts tie. up resoun;es, hamper rapid response, and needlessly complicate relations 
with partners. 
The consultant report suggests that ECHO should require performance indicators in 
project proposals it receives, and should discuss and refine these where necessary. It 
is  only  in  this  way  that it  is  possible  to judge whether  individual· projects :taken 
together contribute to  achieving a broader objective such as might be laid out in ·an 
overall plan for  the co~ntry or region concemed.(what ECHO calls a 'GlobalPlan'). 
The  Framework· Partnership  Agreement  is  not  currently· geared. towarqs  sucli  an 
·approach, and evaluations ha~e recorded few cases where grantees have offered such 
indicators spontaneously. The weakness in pefining objectives and measuring re~ults 
does not extend only to field operations, but also encompasses visibility arid disaster · 
. preparedness. 
The  Commission  concurs  that there is  considerable scop·e  to  re-engineer ECHO's . 
procedures in order to focus on measuring results and developing strategy and policy, 
in  individual instances  and across  the board.  At the same time,  this  is  not by any 
means  a  problem  unique  to  ECHO.  A  number  of the.  changes  which  might  be 
· desirable will require broader, institut.f:on-leyel change as ·indicated above: 
It  is  correct to  emphasise controlling results,  and the new FPA  wiih  its  standard 
forms for· requests,  intermediate  and final· reports  is  already  a  step  in  tke  rtght 
direction!  even if  more s.hould 'be done.;  At ·the same ti'me.  it should not be forgotten 
13 ,that measuring results  is  llll  equal~v time consuming (md challenging joh, and that 
line-item budgeting and coillrol remains a prevalent culture in  mosi administrations  . 
•  %~{ling from  input  control  to  results  measuring. prcsitpposes  a  good· deal  of 
groundwork ami may  not,  even  in  the  long  nm.  have  a  net  ~{feel  f?{frecing  up 
resources: it may indeed I"C.'lJUire t/l(:l' he strength£'1wcl., Maintenance of  input controls 
in parallel, even if  simplified,  would merely add to the resource requirement. A shift 
to  controlling  result~  is  fJOnetheless  .  additionally  desirable  in  the  interests  ·of 
shortening response_time. 
•:•  Rela~ionship to the field 
The consultant report criticises what it views as ECHO's centralised decision-making, 
an<.l·rccommen<.ls greater responsibilities be divested to the· field.  It notes the problem 
that  ECHO  is  mostly  represented  in  the  field  by staff' on  short-term contracts,  and 
notes additional weaknesses in  the management of  this staff in areas such as training, 
support and security. It also criticises ECHO's remoteness from  the normal network 
of  Commission delegations.  · 
The  Commission notes that ECHO is unique in the humanitarian world in having 70-
80  staff permanently  in  the  field.  80%  of this  contract  staff is  located  within 
delegations.  This  specialised· staff is  expected to play a key role in  assessing needs, 
coordinating and monitoring performance throughout the project cycle, and makes an 
indispensable contribution in  so doing.  In  reality,  therefore,  decision-making is often 
more field-driven in practice than it may seem at  first sight. 
Nonetheless.  the  Commission  is  fully  convinced of the  need for operations  to  be 
conducted in close relation to the field and  for further efforts in this direct~  on,  as well 
as on the need to increase ~:vnergies between the .field am/ HQ.  Existing selection and 
recruitment procedures  am/ employment conditions impose constraints  in  ensuring 
adequate supply and retention of  suiiably qualified sttij}. which need to he addressed 
·at the institutional/eve/.  The non-statutory nature rf  this staff  also restricts the extent 
to  which decision-making responsibilities can he devolved to  it.  Some consideration 
· should he given to a combined approach consisting in enlarging the scopefor posting 
statutory staff  to the field whilst at the same time building in the necessary flexibility 
offered hy a less binding statzis.  .  '  · 
•:•  Need to strengthen management 
The  consultants  go  at  length  into· issues  of ECHO's  internal  organisation  and 
management  which,  in  their  view,  have  contributed  to  many  of the  weaknesses 
observed. They go ·so far as  to describe management as  "the single most frequently 
criticised  element brought to  the  attention of the  evaluators,  not  only  by extern.al 
organisations; but, more importantly, by a majority of  respondents within ECHO, both 
in  the  field  and  at  headquarters".  They  specifically  recommend  that  horizontal 
functions and operations mutually reinforce each other to a much greater extent.. 
Many ·of  the problepts highlighted relate to personnel policy and project management 
and result from rules or procedures which are determined at the Commission level or 
even hv Council and Parliament; they are not, therefore, susceptible of  solution at the 
level of.an individual service such as ECHO.  The Commissif!n has already declared 
its firm intention to address the issues-which arise at the  institutional level. 
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This  ·~·et of  issues aside.  however,  there remain many immediate. practical prqhlems. 
· whiclr must he addressed.  It is clear that impifimenting many of  the conclusions of  the 
consultant report ll'i/1  have impC?.rtant  managerial aiul organisational consequences 
for HCI-10.  The1'c  may also he :<;(:ope,  as the Colnmi.\'sion. has  aliwu~v envisaged, for 
so11wpooling (i  mpacitics (md nmsequei1t economies o( scale hetween  ECHO and 
the DGfor Devdopinent.  ·  ·  .  . 
•!•  Human Resources· 
The consultants pay -tribute to  the commitinent and professionalism of ECHO staff . 
both in the field and at .HQ; but note that there is a sho~fall, espeCially at HQ, of.staff . 
with qmilifications and field experience in humanitarian or devel<;>pment matters, and 
that this lack has significant consequences for the quality of  pr~ject management and 
.  is  perceived as  a particular shortcoming by partners.  "J:hcy  note as  well a particular 
need to ensure that all operational staff have recei~ed training in project management 
and financial management. In the view of  the consultants, the Commission sometimes 
has had ambitions which were unr·ealistic given the staffing levets available to ECHO 
and  other constraints.  The report calls  for  qualitative  improvement in skills,  and  a _ 
realistic·correspondance between staffing levels and tasks. 
Given how the Commission· currently recruits staff, it is,  of  course,  very exceptional 
for staff,  ho.wever  well  qual~'fied in  other areas,  to ·arrive in  ECHO  with  specific 
quali{tcaiions or experience in or related to humanitarialt assistance.  To some extent, 
this problem also chardcter(ses other operators in the humanitarian sector.  Training 
must b~.used to a greater exte1it than is currently the casf:  to offset this shortcoming· 
and fill the gap.  It is also necessary to provide for supplementary speCialised staff  at · 
HQ.  ·The Commission intends to emphasise both points more in the future. 
Regarding the relationship between staffing and tasks.· the Commission has already  ' 
. declared  its  intention  to  introd,uce  activity-based  budgeting  and  more  generally 
activity-based management.  Steps are being taken  but tools  and training still need 
further·qevelopment and emphasis.  · 
.  .  .·  II  .  .  ,.  .  .  . . 
The lev'el of  staffing at ECHO is ver:v low  at around two members of  staff  at HQ per 
f:' I 0 million o(tinancial decisions, including secretarial and other support sta.fl' this. 
is a ]ower figure than characterises most other Commissic~n.departments and less still 
than most national cidministrations. During the first part of  the period covered by the 
consultant report,  staff coverage was less still; only arOltnd_l ,3 per €. I 0 mlllion in _ 
/996.  Pressures are therefore intense.  Whatever  the  improvements· in  productivity, . 
there ·would still he a need for ft.lOre staff  at ECHO Headqua~ters to achieve the level. 
of  impact which the Commission would wish.
12 
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. The staffing levels  q~_oted cover o~ly statutory (pemianent ~~d non-permanent) headquarters _staff. 
12  This  recommendation  does  not  ig~ore  th~ fact  that  staffing  levels  In  the· field -have  increas~d 
substantially during the period of the e\lali.uition.  ·  · 
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( .  •:•  Partner relations and the Framework Partnership Agreement 
ECI-IO's basic modus operandi consists of providing fumls to NGOs, the UN and the 
Red  Cross,  for  identified  projects,  under  a  'Framework  Partnership  Agreement' 
(FP/\), a new  versi011 of which  entered  ii1to  force  this  war. The consultants, while 
noting improvements in  the FPA, find  numerous reasons to  review-this instrument in 
terms of its  philosophy,  practicalities and  relationship  with  the  project cycle.  The 
essentially reactive, project.:.based approach of the FPA itself is  at  least questionable 
when it comes to major players suchas the UN agencies, ICRC and IFRC which issue 
con:;olidated  appeals  and  pursue  - with  the  encouragement  of most  institutional 
donors  - a  programme rather than project approach.  Such partners  are  obliged to 
follow suigeneris procedures and invent sometimes artificial 'projects' in order to fit 
in  with  ECHO's requirements,  without this necessarily  enhancing either quality or 
control.. 
More  generally,  the  consultants  carried  out  numerous  interviews  with.  ECHO's 
partners, · and  found .a  lot  of dissatisfaction  with  the  relationship,  both  as  it  is 
conceptualised  and  in  practice.  The  report  does  agree  with  the  emphasis  in  the 
Regulation  on  preserving  the  independence  and  multiplicity  of non-governmental . 
actors. 
'To some extent,  tensions with partners are inevitable and may even be a sign of  the 
Commission's doing its job in  trying to ensure accounttihility and performance. It  is 
self evident  that  the  Commission  will  ensure  that  all  ECHO  activities  will  be 
conducted within the scope of  Regulation 1257/96.  The  FPA  has been an important 
instrument  in  managing  large  quantities  of aid  in  a · specific  administrative 
environment, and is to some extent unique.  Nonethele~s. the Commission agrees that 
there is room for improvement and that a· review of  the new FPA  system is desirable, 
in the .first instance especial(v for the Red Cross and UN  agencies. Some steps in this 
directioi1 have already been taken.  This. point is taken up jitrther below. 
•:•  ~eed  to enhance coordination with Member States 
The consultant report generally advocates creating a greater sense of cor-tmunity in 
EU humani.tarian aid between Member States and the Commission, and notes that this 
is a two-way process. Measures such as joint assessments and policy coordination are 
called for. 
The  Commission  shares this  vision  and will continue to  work hard at making it a 
reality  . 
. •:•  Scope to enhance international influence 
The  consultant  report  notes  that  ECHO  has  little  effective  presence  in  important 
·'humanitarian capitals' such as; operationally, Geneva, New York and to some extent · 
Rqmc, and, policy-wise, Washington. As a result the Commission punches well below 
its weight iri the international arena as far as humanitarian issues are concerned  .. 
The  Commission agrees with  the need to accord priorizv to this  issue _whilst  taking 
into account staffing constraints. · 
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6: A programme for the coming years 
The overridillg priority at all  times f(x the C01nmission must of course be to continue 
to addre'ss urgent humanitarian needs wherever they arise. 
Nonetheless,  the  findings  of the  consultants  as  high I  ighted  above  challenge  the 
Commission in  two important ways:_ firstly, at a managerial level, to  improve what 
we do  in the field  of humanitarian assistance, and secondly, at a  strategic level,  to 
ryassess  how  it. fits  into  the  overall  framework  of crisis  prev~ntion, respol)se  ana 
recovery. 
· The Qonsultant  report prompts action most urgently  in  the  first respect. ·While what 
ECHO is doing is  satisfactory, and 'in  some ways even exemplary, there is scope to  · 
make it much better. It would. not be opportune - and this is also a firm conclusion of 
the  consultants  .:__  to  attempt  a  major paradigmatic· reassessment until  the  measures 
required to improve management are firmly in plaGe. 
The main  focus of this part of the Con-imunication ·is  to  lay out a framework fqr both 
the policy direction imd  the management of Community lnm1anitarian activities in the 
future~ in  terms of a performance co·n.tract between ECHO and its m'ain stakeholders: 
Necessarily; however- bearing in mind the calendar imposed by the Regulation:_ a 
number of  details will need to be elabonite,d in, a second stage.  '  · 
Enhancing performance. is  a  process.  Aq::ordingly,  the  intention  is  to  refil).e  the 
ori~ntations of this performance contract periodically and in an iterative manner. As 
·  . of end 2000, the Commission intends to use the vehicle of the annual report required 
under the Regulationto report on its progress towards these objectives, and its yearly 
strategy papers will provide an update arid an opportunity to  discus~ evolving issues 
as necessary.· 
6. 1 General performance. strategy 
. •!;  Identifying stakeholders, defini'ng strategy 
lkttcr to do  what,  for  whom? This question  is  at  the  core ofany reassessment of 
t~pcnitional strategy. in government, and will be at the core of the Commission's.own 
reflection regarding ECHO.  '  ·  · 
In  ~eeking to orient ECHO firmly  a~d, ~hove all, concretely towards its stakeholders, 
the Commission is proposing the introduction of a  new administrative culture and set 
of  vall;les which over time will substantially enhance· accountability and performance. 
Stakeholder  satisfaction· will  be  measured, .·made  public  and  fed  back  into  the 
·organisation's production process.  · 
It is, of course, in  the nature of public activity that stakeholders are varied and their 
.  ·interests do not always coincide. The essential principle is that an- open and informed 
process must be put in plate to  poll the views of all those affected by public activity 
ormandated to represent those who are.  -
.;-· 
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r In  the case of ECI-10,  the Commission believes that  its  most basic stakeholders are, 
firstly,  those  affected by humanitarian crises and,  secondly,  European citizens who· 
need to  be convinced that the effort is  worthwhile and  that the money is  well  spent. 
Ciii;cns' interests arc mediated and  expressed through the  European  Parliament and 
Member State Gov~.:rnments and Parliaments, making accountability a necessity. 
ECHO also has a specific relationship with its partner operational agencies: they play 
a fundamental  role  in  ensuring that the humanitarian assistance and protection that 
ECHO funds are of  the desired high quality.  , 
The Commission intends: 
•  To  study  the  possible  introduction,  into  the  aid  projects  it  finances,  of 
requirements to· monitor and report the attitudes of direct beneficiaries, or, 
where emergency conditions make this impossible, at  least to include this 
aspect in ex-post evaluations;  ·  -· · 
•  To  establish  best  practice  benchmarks  and· overall  performance  targets, 
based  on  ECHO's  and  other  donors'  exp~.:rience,  as  a  guarantee  to . 
taxpayers Qf the efficiency of the aid  given,  and,  in  addition. to  existing 
statistical reports, to report on progress towards ,such targets to Parliament 
and  through  the  Humanitarian  Aid  Committee  (this  issue  is  taken  up 
further below).  · 
The  Humanitarian  Aid  Committee -will  continue. to  be  a  key  forum  for· policy 
coordination with the Member States in the field ofhumanitarian aid
13
• 
•!•  Relations with partners: a central challenge 
At  least as things currently stand,  ECHO provides its assistance exclusively through · 
. partners.  Each of these agencies has  its own personality, and it is  only by means of 
effective teamwork that joint goals can be accomplished. At the same time, it is right 
and proper that ECHO insists on high standards. The relationship between ECHO and 
partners is so crucial and fundamental to  improving ECIIO's own perfonnance that it 
must assume a central place in organisational strategy. 
The Commission intends: 
•  To discuss further with its partners additional  practical ways to improve 
the joint work, and to report ori those discussions; 
•  To further build on its partnership with key multilateral agencies such as 
the UN and Red. Cross by offering those which are interested, in addition 
to  operational  funding,  programmed  support  for  activities  of mutual 
interest subject to the provisions of Regulation  1257/96
14 bearing in mind 
the  need  to  en$ure  efficient  and  well  targeted  delivery  of humanitarian 
assistance by all partners; 
13  The reference to this Committee is  a pragmatic one based· on curTent practice, and not intended to 
prejudice discussions around cornitology or the role of  other Council bodies 
1 ~ This approach has been termed 'active multilateralism'' 
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•  To reinforce its strategy of assisting the NGO community .to build c~pacity 
through  the  recently-introduced Grant Facility  for  Studies,  Training and 
Networks;· 
To enhance substantially its  relati~nship with  represent<ttive NGO such as 
VOICE 
1
.:i.  while  respecting  the  limitation~  to  ·its ·mandate . which  its 
membe~s  have imposed. 
/ 
6.2 Strategic Management Plan · 
The  Commission  intends  to  review  ail  of ·ECHO's  activities  from  a  management 
perspective,  including  resource  impliCations,  and  to  establish  in  consequence· a 
strategic management plan, which will be open to broad scrutiny and periodic review; 
•!•  Mission statement, benchmarks and performance tar9ets 
The Commission intends: 
•  To ensure that. ECHO has a clear mission statement, set of objectives and  ·. 
clearly defined priorities..  .  ·  ·  · 
•  To visit and document best practices of  major humanitarian donors, within 
the  EU and  outside,  with a  view to  discovering practices which ECHO · 
might also adopt; 
•  To  give  specific  objectives  and  associate  ni·easurable  indicators  to  all  .  \ 
Global  ~lans, ·communication  activities  and  the , DI,PECHO  disaster 
preparedness  programme,  and .  to  request  such  indicators  in  projects 
wherever possible;  ' 
• ·  To collect and report rnore systematically perlonnance targets for its own 
. administration, to include such-:-data as time to  reply to' proposals, payment. 
dCiays,  hours  of  staff  training,  administrative  processmg  time  for· 
ptop~sals, and so forth.  .  . 
.  '  . 
~:·  Overhauling project management and other internal procedures 
The Commission intends: 
• ·  To continue its efforts at reviewing the project management cyc~e, ·taking 
into account the constraints ofhumanitarian and emergency response, with 
particular emphasis on:  devoting more resources to  sound ex-ante needs 
·analysis and. ensuring a  system  is  in  place  to  track the  performance of 
partner1;;  ·  ·· · 
•  To  establish  ciear  statements  of policy  applying  to  funding, decisions, · 
including choice of  partners; 
•  To carry out a review of the Framework Partnership Agreement system in 
the -light of the observations and prinCiples mentioned above, with a view 
15  ·Voluntary  Organisations  in  Cooperation  in  Emergencies,  a  subsidiary ·organ  of the  ·Liaison 
.  Committee of Development NGOs to the European Uti ion 
19 .  .  '  ' 
to enhanced effectiveness, maximum simplific<;tion, and accountability not 
only for expenditure, but also for results;  . 
•  To·  reinforce ECHO's field driven .approach,  in  line with the observations 
. set  out  above,  by  promoting  the  changes  in  current  recruitment. and 
employment  policy  for  both  field  and  headquarters  staff necessary  to 
ensure flexibility; 
•  To  develop,  by  the  end  of 2000  at  the  latest,  a  trammg  programme  in. 
· support  of  this  strategy,·  including  obligatory  courses  on  financial 
management and  project  management  for ·all  staff involved  in  managing 
contracts;  . 
•  To promote a learning culture and enhance institutional memory· within the 
Office.  · 
6.3 Wider policy issues 
· •!•  A coherent and effective strategy for the ''grey zone" dilemma 
It would be a very sterile ·exercise  to  try  to  define precise conditions which· either 
justify or ·preclude the involvement of ECHO in a particular crisis or. sector. ·More · 
important are the overall strategies to be developed on a case-by-case basis. The result 
of increased clarity on mission should be increased predictability as to the likelihood 
and form of  ECHO intervention on the part -of all actors concerned. 
Taking  adva~tagc  of  the  bringing  together  of  development  and . humanitarian 
portfolios,  the  Commission  also  intends  by  July  2000  to  inform· the  Council  and 
Parliament further on how it  will  implement a coherent and effective strategy in the 
framework  of linking  relief,  rehabilitation  and  development,  thereby  clarifying 
responsibilities in the grey zone. 
•:•  A longer term strategy review 
•  Over the  longer term,  the  Commission· intends to  review  the totality of 
Commission instrum~nts intervening in crisis situations, and ECHO within 
this context. The consultant report has provided plenty of food for thought 
and  the  Commission  is  very  keen  to  launch  a  debate  on  the  following 
priority issues :Conflict prevention/early warning and peace-building 
•  Disaster preparedness and its place within development assistance 
·  •  Operational emergency response 
·· •  How to  ensure that humanitarian aid ·operations are planned and carried 
· out  in  such  a  way  as  to  ensure  as  much  as  p'ossible  the  protection of 
peopl~'s basic human·rights16  ·  · 
In the course of this process, the Commission will also 'review the humanitarian aid 
regulation in a fresh light and in relation to other regulations governing other aspects 
16 This does not at all imply that respect for  human  ~ghts is a condition for provision of humanitarian 
· assistance.· 
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related  to  crisis response.  It is  planned to  report to  Council and  Parliament in this 
respect by June :2001  at the latest. ·  - . 
7~ Conclusions  ·' 
~'-
The consultants recognise  the  value of ECHO's  ~ork, and,  while  .. critical· in  many 
respects,  on .balance review  it  positively.  Above and beyond a consideration of the· 
efficiency of individual'operations, the Office's important contribution to  the EU's 
. external identity is also recognised. ECHO's.continued and vigorous existence is not . 
only considered fully justified, but strongly affirmed.  - .  · 
The Commissipn shares the overall positive assessment of ECHO, but is nonetheless 
conscious of the  challenges  identi lied  and determined to  reach' the highest possible 
international  standards in  this important area of its  work.  This Communication has, 
accordingly,  focused  on areas  for  improvement and set out an  initial  pr<,>gramme  to  · 
achieve it 
\,' 
The program~e is  undoubtedly ambitious. It \viii  take time and wiil.require a major 
investm~nt from  staff and stakeholders. The Commission feels  it is impoitantto set 
out clear, highstaildards and to be accountable for .meeting them, but it certainly does 
not  underestimate  the  difficulties 'or  the  c'onstraints  involved,  of which  staffing' 
constraints  are perhaps the  most  significant.  Throughout,  tne  intentio·n  is  to· report  . 
openly and at least on an annual basis on  both progress and any setbacks encountered, 
and.to-~eek, where possible and necessary, solutions together.  -
Lastly,  While  improvements  to  the  Regulation  may  be· possible,  the  Commission 
believes that  it is an appropriate framework to accommodate the programme set in 
this Communication, and that this is a sufficient focus for ECHO at this point in time. 
It docs intend, nonetheless, to study and keep this option open for the future. 
This  Commission  is  forWarding  this  Communication  tp  Council  and  Parliament 
together with the consultant report itself. 
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